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Introduction

With the end of the East-West confrontation and the disappearance of an overt adversary, Europeans have started to promote regional cooperation. By signing the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992 to create the European Union, European states accelerated the integration process under the guidance of market democracy. It might be said that the desire of Jean Monnet, who dedicated himself to the creation of an antiwar community in Post-World War II Europe and contributed to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, has come to the fore among Europeans espousing the idea of European Identity.

On the other hand, with the signing of the CFE Treaty in November 1990, NATO, the winner of the Cold War, altered its military posture and modified its military strategy to accommodate itself to a new security environment in Europe. NATO also began proceeding with enlargement to the East in order to create a war-free Euro-Atlantic area. In addition, NATO has applied its efforts to increase its capability for crisis management, in order to manage the frequent regional and ethnic conflicts which have broken out in the Post-Cold War world. NATO's efforts in search of a new security regime might be seen as aiming for the creation of the Atlantic Community which US President John F. Kennedy envisioned in the early 1960s, and to transform NATO from a military alliance into a community with common values that will foster freedom and democracy in the world.

However, as the EU has faced difficulties in coordinating interest among the member states in the course of further integration, NATO is encountering certain problems in accommodating itself to the new security environment. This paper takes up two issues—enlargement to the East and crisis management—and discusses how NATO should manage them for the future of the alliance. This paper also discusses how these European security issues will affect the course of Japan's security.

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NATO Enlargement to the East

Around the time of the Malta Summit between the United States and the Soviet Union in December 1989, at which both states announced the end of the Cold War, NATO changed its

raison d'être from the previous “framework for a military alliance” to a “political framework for an international alliance”(1). Then, at the July 1990 NATO summit in London, NATO declared “We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty” (2) and began to accommodate itself to a new security environment in Europe, in which the Soviet Union (and later Russia) could not be categorized as “the enemy.” Keeping the “bottom line” of collective self-defense against future uncertainties in an unthreatening manner, NATO tried to develop its capabilities as a security organization for all of Europe by modifying the “superstructure”, such as the joint military organization and the common strategy (3).

NATO enlargement to the East, however, created a curious reversal in NATO. This was because, while the existing NATO states had begun to seek restructured relations with Russia, the former East European states, anticipating Russia’s recovery, began to expect admission to NATO as a “military alliance.” Although NATO had fully realized the necessity to fill the power vacuum generated in the former East European states, there was an appreciation that such action by NATO would cause Russia to defy it as a new containment measure, which might provide another excuse to the nationalists in Russia and trigger new confrontation. From the start, the issue of NATO enlargement contained inherent theoretical contradictions.

In late August 1993, the press reported that Russian President Boris Yeltsin had given “implicit approval” to Poland’s participation in NATO in talks with Polish President Lech Walesa. This was something that the Polish government had been expecting. These external conditions touched off the sudden surfacing of the NATO’s enlargement arguments, which had not been a topic of official discussions. As a result, at the Informal Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Travemuende, the ministers provisionally agreed that, while the immediate goal was the structuring of cooperative relations in peacekeeping activities through the framework of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), NATO would also consider certain new activities geared towards future enlargement, NATO would individually consult with any active participant in the PfP if that partner perceived a direct threat to its territorial integrity, and thus the issue was carried (4).

The discussions on enlargement of NATO appeared to have reached a certain level of agreement. However, it did not resolve the dissatisfaction of the former East European states. In October, incidentally, the instability of the Russian domestic situation was made apparent by the forceful suppressive actions against the Russian White House carried out by President Yeltsin. There was appreciation that such a firm attitude by Yeltsin might drive Russia to take hard-line foreign policies again. There was also a risk that the reactionaries in Russia, who had

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started to rise under the slogan of resurrecting a strong Russia, might cause the Yeltsin Administration to be disturbed. The PfP did not satisfy the expectations of these former East European states.

At the same time, the United States government made new moves to accelerate enlargement of NATO. President Clinton announced that the issue of enlargement of NATO was a matter of “when and how to execute” during his visit to the Czech Republic in January 1994, which communicated subtle changes in the US government’s posture. In July 1994, President Clinton visited Poland and announced that Poland was the first candidate for new membership of NATO and that Russia, which was opposed to enlargement of NATO, had no authority to refuse it. Although the UK and France still frowned upon the United States’ attempts to accelerate the enlargement movement, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl officially supported enlargement in November by placing priority on the stability of the neighboring states. In December, less than a year after the adoption of the PfP, NATO allies agreed to the enlargement policy in keeping with the intentions of the United States. Thus, the issue had been transformed from the initial questioning of the pros and cons of enlargement to the specific decision stage of “who and when” (5).

In late September 1995, when the conflict in former Yugoslavia seemed to have abated as a result of NATO’s heavy bombing in Bosnia, NATO sent a document on its enlargement policy to PfP member states, all but brushing off Russian opposition. This document stipulated that the objective of NATO enlargement was to provide increased stability and security for all in the Euro-Atlantic Area. It also stipulated the rights and duties for the members of NATO, and urged further efforts on the part of the states seeking new participation, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, to satisfy those conditions (6). In addition, in December 1995, NATO mentioned for the first time the “cooperative security” that informed the new relationship with Russia and sought the understanding of the Russians. Russians, however, were unlikely to accept this announcement by NATO that stipulated the structuring of a security system in which the assurance of security of one party would not damage the security of the other.

The gap between NATO and Russia was not bridged in 1996, mainly because both the United States and Russia were obsessed with their own domestic affairs and because Yeltsin’s ailment was serious. Even at the summit held in March 1997, Clinton and Yeltsin could not bridge the gap. Yet Russia did not have enough power to stop the already-turning wheels of NATO enlargement. Thus, in late May, both sides signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, and agreed to establish the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). These measures reflected NATO’s expectation

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that, in return for Russian tolerance of enlargement, NATO would consult closely with Russia before NATO puts its own policies into force. As a result, at the summit held in Madrid in July 1997, NATO decided to invite Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to become new members, in accordance with the US open-door policy (a policy permitting any country that applies for membership and meets the requirements to join the alliance).

In this way, NATO achieved the first stage of enlargement without coming up against a tough stance or a shift in military posture by Russia. However, at the Prague Summit in November 2002, new problems will be added to the unresolved ones of the first stage, when the candidates for the second round are nominated.

The first problem is the relationship with Russia, which still regards NATO as a military alliance. In this sense, the affiliation of the Baltic states is most contentious (7). If Lithuania joins NATO, the Kaliningrad Oblast will be severed from Russia, and Russia would face a difficult situation, similar to the one faced by the West with former West Berlin. In this case, there is no doubt that the creation of a corridor via Belarus and Poland would become a problem. If Estonia and Latvia join the Alliance, even if NATO troops are not to be stationed in these states, it would create a situation where the NATO defense line comes into direct contact with Russia. Consequently, if the Russian military, State Duma, or others worry about the situation, they may feel frustration both with themselves and with President Putin, who is searching for a way to compromise with NATO. This may result in demands by Russia for the early amendment of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, or, if a tight Russian military budget hinders the improvement and reinforcement of conventional forces, Russia may adopt a first-use policy and deploy tactical nuclear weapons which do not contravene existing treaties.

Thus, the May 2002 Summit agreement between Russia and NATO on establishment of the NATO-Russia Council seems to reassure Russia (8). This is because the new council, in place of the PJC inaugurated in May 1997, gave Russia equal status with the NATO members in discussion of common security issues, such as antiterrorism, and encouraged decision by consensus (9). The new council, however, has its limitations. Although the council was ostensibly created to allow Russia to participate in the NATO decision-making process, and gave Russia the appearance of “quasi-member” status in NATO, this new council was as notable for what it left out as for what it included. More specifically, it was based on the understanding that Russia would not participate in discussions relating to NATO’s strategic concept or its force structure, which that are the very roots of the military alliance. The establishment of the NATO-Russia Council was nothing more than the product of a

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compromise designed to be politically advantageous to Putin—who is seeking good relations with NATO—in return for his tacit acceptance of the next NATO enlargement.

From this point of view, transformation of NATO’s military posture will be important. It is expected that, at the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO will agree to an increase in its crisis management capabilities, which the US government has made much of since the end of the 1990s. Taking the limited military resources of the allies into consideration, NATO will acquire new military capabilities, such as strategic transport, command, control and communications, and precision guided munitions, at the expense of scaling down its territorial defense capabilities. Hence, further transformation of NATO’s superstructure, through the amendment of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, is expected to reassure Russia.

A second problem is the redefinition of the Alliance for the next enlargement. In the United States, in late February 1998, at the start of the ratification proceedings at the Senate, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright explained the significance of the enlargement of NATO at the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee as follows, and sought understanding (10). First, she expressed the view that “a larger NATO will make the U.S. safer by expanding the area of Europe where wars do not happen, second, a larger NATO has given the states of Central and Eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems, and third, the new member states will add strategic depth to the alliance, not to mention well over 200,000 troops, and we will make NATO itself stronger and more cohesive.” In contradiction of its external explanation, the US administration was regarding NATO as a military alliance, and this tone found its way into the Senate discussions. Thus, at the end of April, this bill was passed in the Senate by the remarkable majority of 80 to 19. As a result, however, Congress added several conditions of enlargement that included: “NATO is first and foremost a military alliance;” “a strong United States leadership of NATO promotes and protects the United States’ vital national security interests;” “the United States maintains its leadership role in NATO through the stationing of US combat forces in Europe, providing military commanders for key NATO commands, and through the presence of the US nuclear forces on the territory of Europe;” and various other stipulations based on the traditional character of NATO as a “military alliance” (11).

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However, the US administration’s rationale for the first round of enlargement could not be applied to the second round. The states that will be nominated for the second round of enlargement would not contribute to the strengthening of NATO’s military capability. In addition, the future role of the Alliance remained unclear (12).

Let us assume that no future military threats will come from inside Europe and that efforts to reduce the likelihood of Article 5 incidents will continue through stronger relations with Russia and through disarmament. If so, through a revision of decision-making systems and/or role differentiation between the allies, and instead of the present cohesion, NATO may become a framework for joint military action or for affirmation of a common will to manage new types of threat which would occur outside Europe. At the same time, the future role of NATO, which had found its *raison d'être* by committing itself to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, may be affected by the US vision of the "Atlantic Community." However, there is a difference of views among the allies on the future role of NATO.

US and European Views on the Crisis Management Mission

The decreased dependence on the US military capability brought about by the end of the Cold War has provided an opportunity for European states to display their autonomy, even in the area of national security. The EC Summit held in Maastricht in December 1991 agreed to create the European Union for further integration, and, bringing the issue of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to the fore, the member states expressed their intention to strengthen ties with the Western European Union (WEU), the independent European security organization. This describes the changing strategic environment in Europe most eloquently (13). Yet, even though abdicating the role of the world's policeman in the post-Cold War world, the United States, regarding itself a world leader, needed a way to stay involved in European politics. Therefore, from the United States' point of view, the increasing European role in security issues should be conducted through the "European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO". At the same time, if the United States was to be a leader of NATO, it would have to bestow on the Alliance new roles in addition to the role envisioned in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

In May 1991, NATO Defence Ministers agreed to establish the Immediate Reaction Force and the Rapid Reaction Force. This demonstrated NATO's intention of responding quickly to regional and ethnic conflicts occurring outside the NATO defense area. In parallel with this, some European states took their first step down the road to independence. In October 1991, France, anticipating the Maastricht Treaty, announced to the President of the European Commission its intention to establish a Euro-corps with Germany. In November 1992, when European integration gained momentum with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, French and German military leaders consulted with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and agreed that military operations connected with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty should

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be conducted by NATO, but that the WEU could execute independent humanitarian aid operations and peacekeeping missions separately from NATO.

Meanwhile, viewing the European movement to be inevitable, the US government devised new measures to keep the WEU's activities within the framework of NATO. Although they were advocating independent military activities, the WEU lacked sufficient military capabilities and thus would have to rely on the US in this regard. This would clearly become the key.

At the above-mentioned Informal Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers, convened in October 1993 to discuss enlargement to the East, US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin advanced a proposal on creating a Combined and Joint Task Force (CJTF), in which NATO—that is to say the United States—would provide the WEU with its military assets for conducting military activities under the guidance of the CFSP, which the United States would not take part in. The proposal was realistic and reasonable because it was impossible militarily and financially for the Europeans to prepare command, control and communications systems, and other military equipment, on their own, and because both sides of the Atlantic had to avoid unnecessary duplication. Thus, the establishment of the CJTF was approved at the NATO Summit in Brussels in January 1994. Progress in working out the details continued thereafter and NATO announced the official inauguration of the CJTF in June 1996.

The inauguration of the CJTF, a non-permanent military force within NATO, was very important to the United States. Firstly, this force has opened, albeit indirectly, an avenue for NATO to justify its military activities outside the defense area defined by Article 5 of the Treaty, using the WEU, which is not under such restrictions. Secondly, it tacitly confirmed a priority of NATO in which the United States plays the leading role when both NATO and WEU decide to launch the same campaign. Thirdly, in conjunction with the first two points, the United States has got a systemic guarantee of a voice in the decision-making process of the WEU, even when the WEU is different from what the United States envisions.

The arguments on crisis management between NATO and WEU appeared to have accomplished certain settlement. However, a completely new situation was created when the heads of the UK and France announced in early December 1998 their intention to create a rapid deployment force, and when the US proposed to strengthen NATO soon thereafter. The expectations of a Europe aiming for broader discretion in the form of more independent military capabilities came into collision with those of the US not only to increase the range of crisis management activities of NATO but also to conduct the combat operation missions exclusively by NATO.

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In early December 1998, the heads of the UK and France met in Saint-Malo, where they announced the Joint Declaration to add original military function to EU and to establish a rapid deployment force of more than 30,000 troops. In this Joint Declaration, both heads of state made clear their intention to enact the CFSP which had been strengthened in function by the Amsterdam Treaty (an amended version of the Maastricht Treaty adopted in October 1997), and in particular to increase their ability to conduct a common defense policy for Europe. The declaration called for an enhancement of the EU's capacity for autonomous action so as to be able to mount a rapid reaction to the new risks, backed up by credible military forces, and emphasized the necessity of solidarity between the EU members for that purpose. In addition, clearly stating the necessity for acting in conformity with NATO's obligations, it also emphasized possible military actions in which NATO as a whole would not be engaged. Thus, the EU embarked on a course toward building up their own military forces outside the context of the US-backed CJTF.

At the North Atlantic Council meeting in December 1998, when NATO's military intervention in Kosovo was in the air, US Secretary of State Albright presented seven agenda items to be solved to harmonize the intentions of NATO, and, in particular, proposed the addition of countermeasures against the proliferation of mass destruction, ethnic and regional conflicts and other diversified threats as NATO's main missions at the summit meeting to be held in April 1999 in Washington DC (14). In general, the member states of Europe maintained a cautious stance against the enlargement of engagement outside the area, as proposed by the United States. This was because they were anxious about a situation in which NATO's new mission would be justified in principle, and then expanded at US initiative. Furthermore, they feared that the crisis management measures, which even included military action to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which the United States adopts as a platform, would be expanded to the Middle East and Africa, as seen in the air operations in Iraq by US and British forces, and that they might develop beyond the limits of national strength and national interests.

Thus, in early February 1999, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, who was deeply concerned about this problem posed by the United States, emphasized that they should not regard activities that arose in regions outside the joint defense area stipulated in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as "international policeman" activities by NATO. He also announced that each item of NATO activities of this nature would require the approval of all the members, in accordance with the existing consensus system, and confirmed that such actions should be in the spirit of both international law and the UN Charter (15). As a result, the Strategic Concept which NATO adopted in April 1999, when the bombing of Kosovo was starting, stipulates that

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the member states shall review, item by item, whether NATO should be engaged in crisis management activities that include military operations, and that these actions would be selected only when the entire membership agreed on the engagement, and that on those occasions, Article 7 of the Washington Treaty (which stipulates the priority of the role of the UN Security Council) must be observed(16). Contrary to US expectations, NATO set a limit on its own crisis management activities.

Meanwhile, the EU concentrated its efforts on the establishment of its own rapid deployment force. At the June 1999 Summit, the member states agreed that they would integrate these kinds of military activities into the EU and dissolve the WEU. In late November 1999, a meeting of the EU, attended by defense ministers of the member states, called for a strengthening of the EU Security and Defense Policy in preparation for the Helsinki Summit the following month. At this meeting, approval was given for the creation of military forces to conduct EU-led crisis management operations, the creation of the Political and Security Committee and the Military Committee respectively, and the maintenance of strong ties with NATO. In concert with the EU meeting, the British and French governments held a summit in London the same month, at which both countries called on the European Council in Helsinki to take a decisive step forward in the developing its own corps-level rapid-deployment forces with the necessary C3I, logistics, combat support and so forth. Taking US concerns into consideration, they also declared that NATO remained the foundation of their collective defense and that it would continue to play an important role in crisis management (17).

At the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the member states officially approved deployment of the forces by the year 2003. The force should be capable of the full range of Petersburg tasks, as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons), and be capable of being deployed within 60 days and for at least one year. They also made clear their intention to establish a standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) comprised of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level, and a Military Committee (MC) to give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC when necessary, and to set up interim bodies by March 2000. They also underlined their determination to develop an autonomous capacity to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises in which NATO as a whole was not engaged, and expressed the view that the process would avoid unnecessary duplication and did not imply the creation of a European army (18).

Immediately after the EU Summit of mid-December 1999, the North Atlantic Council held in Brussels acknowledged the resolve of the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it could take decisions and approve military action when the Alliance as a whole was not

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engaged, and noted that this process would not imply the creation of a European army (19). The Europeans promised the United States that they would not encroach on NATO's role. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, who attended the meeting on behalf of the Secretary of State, emphasized the willingness of the US Government to accept the resolution of the EU, and, in addition, underlined the urgency of closing the gap in US–EU military capability which had become apparent during the Kosovo campaign. He spoke cynically of Europeans who would not increase their own defense budgets to a level compatible with their desires. He also urged the member states of the EU to consider the danger of the spillover of out-of-area crises into NATO's defense area and give special status to NATO member states who were not EU members so that they could participate in the political process (20).

On 12 September 2001, condemning the terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in the United States, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1368, in which the Council regarded the act as a threat to international peace and security, and recognized the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter. Up until then, excepting the unusual US views, terrorism had been considered an emergency handled by domestic legislation, but now it had become subject to the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense. The use of the right to collective self-defense by NATO at the behest of the US, and the resulting NATO attacks on the Taliban—recognized as a terrorist support group—not only blurred the line between crisis management operations and territorial defense activities stipulated by Article 6 of the Washington Treaty, but also created an atmosphere in which NATO—not the EU—which would have primacy in crisis management operations. The decisive factors were: that the terrorist attacks happened in the United States, that only the US maintained sufficient capability to carry out massive counterterrorism operations, and that the EU had never prepared its own forces for impending crises. In fact, the US administration took the opportunity to actively implement antiterrorism and WMD countermeasures.

As a result, at the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002, the European allies will probably, under strong US leadership, agree to implement the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) approved at the Washington Summit in April 1999, with its specific list of items. However, it is a different story with NATO attacks on Iraq. Russia, which is cooperating with NATO on antiterrorism measures, strongly opposes a US attack on Iraq without a UN Security Council resolution. In addition, France, Germany, and other European states feel unease over a US attack on Iraq.

What is the role that NATO should play in the creation of a new world security regime? Should NATO play a central role in joint military actions against the new threats in the world?

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Should NATO instead limit its role to that of a political framework for achieving consensus among the allies and commit military actions to ad hoc coalitions like that of the Gulf War, or to a yet-to-be-created UN force? Will the gaps between the US' and Europe's perceptions of the future role of NATO widen in the face of the differences in national power and national interests? What should the Alliance aim to become? These are the reasons why the direction in which NATO is headed draws our attention.

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Japan's Quest for a New Security Regime

The previous sections examined how NATO's quest for a new security regime and the accompanying systemic changes have created friction between the US and Europe by focusing on NATO's enlargement to the East and its crisis management mission. By way of conclusion, this section takes a look at the influence of NATO's changing nature on Japan's security.

Firstly, Russia's reaction to NATO enlargement will have an important effect on East Asian security, particularly on Japan's security. If Russia reacts negatively to the second round of NATO enlargement and attaches importance to defense of the European theater, it is entirely possible that Russia will seek improved relations with China in order to achieve stability on the eastern front. This will be in sharp contrast to the period of antagonism between China and the Soviet Union during which Russia sought détente with NATO and China sought rapprochement with the United States. Sharing concerns about US hegemony in the Post-Cold War world, China, which is seen as a potential threat by the US, and Russia, which is anxious about NATO expansion to its borders, have dispelled their past antagonism. In fact, in April 1997, the two states agreed on the disengagement of forces deployed around their shared border under the framework of the so-called Shanghai Five. In June 2001 this framework was reorganized into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in which the contracting parties promised cooperation on antiterrorism and other related areas. Furthermore, in July 2001 China and Russia signed the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation in place of the former Treaty of Friendship, Union and Mutual Assistance which had expired in 1980. Then, both heads of state emphasized that the new treaty would not lead to a military alliance, but some words were inserted in the joint declaration to balance US hegemony. In addition, based on this relationship, Russia will acquire foreign capital through arms sales to China, and China will modernize its armed forces, especially its blue-water navy. As a result of this, if the tension between Japan and the US on one hand, and Russia and China on the other, which has been receding in magnitude since the end of the Cold War, were to reappear, accompanied by a US perception of China as a strategic competitor, Japan might be thrown into the tension in East Asia.

Secondly, considering the spread of new types of threats such as terrorism, and the limits of national resources, it is necessary for Japan to prevent inter-state conflicts in the region. Following a lead by NATO of its fruits of arms control and disarmament in Europe, the meeting of defense ministers of Asia-Pacific states in Singapore, as proposed in June 2002 by the then Director-General of the Defense Agency, Mr Nakatani, and the proposal to increase efforts in arms control and disarmament presented by Foreign Minister Kawaguchi at the

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ASEAN Regional Forum in Brunei in July can be seen as a new Japanese initiative aimed at stability in the region. Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to North Korea on 17 September 2002 will lead to normalization of diplomatic relations between the two states, although the negotiations ahead are expected to be arduous. This represents an important opportunity, not only to contribute to peace and stability in East Asia but also to restrain North Korea from its nuclear development program, which is perceived as a direct threat to Japan.

Thirdly, in parallel with the encouragement of international cooperation in the face of new types of threats, as demonstrated by NATO in its collective defense in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September, the diminishing distinction between crisis management operations and territorial defense activities, and the broader application of the inherent right of self-defense may become global trends. However, this does not mean that exercising the right of self-defense will solve all problems. Rather, wider acceptance of this may bring instability to the East Asian security environment, and may obstruct Japan from properly making up for the past in the region. It is also possible to foresee an era in which international cooperation based on UN Security Council resolutions takes first priority. In such an era, it may turn out that the role of the Alliance will be, not as a creator of ad hoc coalitions so much, but as a guarantor of collective security as stipulated in the UN Charter. If so, NATO's quest for a new security regime is not completely unrelated to that of Japan, which has close ties with the United States.

Notes

- (1) See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Facts and Figures* (NATO Information Service, 1984), p.22 and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Facts and Figures* (NATO Information Service, 1989), p.13.
- (2) See *Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council* (The London Declaration), 6 July 1990.
- (3) See Michael Howard, "The Remaking of Europe," *Survival*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (March/April 1990), p.104, in which he dissects NATO into the "bottom line" necessary to maintain Alliance functions (as defined in Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,) and the integrated military organization, command/order systems, deployment of forces, strategy and "superstructure" necessary for adapting to the changing times.
- (4) NATO publicly announced the PfP in January 1994. While this document kept future enlargement of NATO on the table, it also dealt with practicalities and the possibility of emergencies, and included the specific objective of cooperation in peace-keeping missions, which NATO was hoping to adopt as a new sphere of activity. NATO held out

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the possibility of NATO military action in the event of a crisis within the territory of a member state, but stopped short of committing to this, saying that it would discuss each case on its merits; hence, consideration of problematical issues was postponed.

- (5) For a discussion of how NATO's eastward expansion was dominated not by the consensus of Alliance member countries but by the dictates of US national politics, see Yuzuru Kaneko, "NATO Enlargement and the U.S. Administration," *Journal of National Defense* Volume 24, No. 3 (December 1996), pp. 83-98, and Yuzuru Kaneko, "The Birth of a New NATO: A Triumphant Alliance in Jeopardy," *NIDS Security Reports* Volume 2, No. 1 (June 1999), pp. 52-71 (in Japanese). The latter work was reprinted in English in *NIDS Security Reports*, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 80-100.
- (6) "The Study on NATO Enlargement issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," consisting of six chapters, the first stating the purpose and rules of expansion, was sent together with the "Fact Sheet on NATO Enlargement".
- (7) In January 1998 the Clinton administration independently concluded "A Charter of Partnership between the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, and the Republic of Lithuania," which contained language that suggested a US promise of inclusion in NATO.
- (8) The adopted declaration, "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality, Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation," was called the "Rome Declaration".
- (9) At this council, cooperation between Russia and NATO was said to cover these nine items: the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theater missile defense, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation and defense reform, civil emergencies, and new threats and challenges.
- (10) For more information on statements made by US Secretary of State Albright, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Administration Views on the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic*: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 105th. Cong. 2nd. Sess., February 24, 1998, pp. 7-13.
- (11) See U.S. Congress, Senate, *Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic*, 105th. Cong., 2nd Sess., Executive Session, Congressional Record, Vol. 144 (30 April 1998): S3756-S3782.

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- (12) See James M. Goldgeier, “Not When but Who,” *NATO Review*, Spring 2002 (Internet version).
- (13) This summit approved the basic rules of the CFSP, and, in particular, requested the WEU to develop a greater European responsibility on defense matters. In response to this request, the WEU declared that it would form an integral part of the process of the development of the EU and would enhance its contribution to solidarity within NATO. For information on this WEU declaration, see *Declaration of the Member States of Western European Union which are also members of the European Union on the role of WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance*.
- (14) See Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Statement to the North Atlantic Council (Brussels, Belgium, December 8, 1998).
- (15) For information on Secretary General Solana’s lecture at the Aspen Institute in Berlin, see *NATO: A Strategy for the 21st Century, Secretary General’s Wallenberg Lecture* (1 February 1999).
- (16) See *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23 and 24 April 1999*.
- (17) See *Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments on European Defence, Anglo-French Summit, London, Thursday 25 November 1999*.
- (18) See the pages on Common European Policy on Security and Defence in *Presidency Conclusion, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999 (SN 300/99)*. The name “European army” derives from the so-called Pleven Plan in October 1950, just after the outbreak of the Korean War, in which French Prime Minister Rene Pleven, considering the rearmament of West Germany unavoidable in order to prevent aggression by the Soviet Union, proposed the creation of an independent standing army in Europe. Although the plan resulted in the Treaty of European Defence Community, in August 1954 the French parliament refused to ratify it and the plan was not realized.
- (19) See *Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 15 December 1999*.
- (20) See Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, *The State of the Alliance: an American Perspective*, Brussels, 15 December 1999.

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