



IIPS

***“Asian Maritime Organization  
for Security and Cooperation” (AMOSOC)  
—Initial Report on Conceptual Framework—***

***March 31, 2015***

***Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS)***





## Preface

The Symposium on New Maritime Security Architecture in East Asia was held by the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) with the support of the Yomiuri Shimbun in Tokyo on January 30, 2015 with the participation of 9 foreign experts from Southeast Asian countries and China, Taiwan, the U.S., and Australia. Along with the presence of more than 80 professional audience members, the experts had lively discussions.

In my opening remarks, as president of IIPS I proposed the idea of an *“Asian Maritime Organization for Security and Cooperation (AMOSC),”* pointing out that there is no regional organization with maritime domain awareness which is most urgently required for tackling the current situation.

The idea of the AMOSC is very timely, given that the Japan-China summit meeting in November 2014 was followed by the recent Japan-China High-level Consultation on maritime affairs on January 22, and the year 2015 is the year of maritime cooperation between ASEAN and China.


IIPS compiled this initial report on the idea of establishing a multilateral cooperative security framework to better manage maritime security issues in the region, reflecting the outcome of our on-going current research including consultations with a number of regional think-tanks, intellectuals, and officials and also incorporating valuable comments received from the participants during the workshop and symposium held on January 29<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> in Tokyo.

I sincerely hope that this report will be useful as a basis for further discussions in the years to come to promote a multilateral framework to safeguard peace and order in the region. Further, IIPS will continue to consult with all partners in the region on this promising idea which we hope will bring a sea change for regional stability.

**Ken SATO**  
President, IIPS

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## 1. Major Observations on Maritime Security in East Asia

In recent years we have observed a number of dangerous incidents that led to higher tensions in the regional maritime arena. Salient characteristics of those tensions and political realities in East Asia can be summarized as follows:

- In East Asia, major disputes in the region are **not land-centric but maritime-centric**.
- There is **no agreed set of concrete principles for maritime conduct** except current negotiations on the Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China regarding the South China Sea.
- Even a **common understanding on the rule of law including UNCLOS is not fully shared**.
- **Maritime domain awareness of the ASEAN countries is insufficient** due to their limited capabilities.
- East Asia **lacks any regular forum** where diplomats, coast guard officials, and navy officers can get together and discuss maritime issues.
- There are **insufficient maritime confidence building measures** with a multilateral framework in place.
- There are **no multilateral organizations regarding maritime capacity-building** in the region.
- Given a clear trend in the region for increasing military spending, there is **no concrete mechanism to avoid a security dilemma in the future**.

In light of these distinct features of the regional security environment, it is critical to think ahead to come up with policy suggestions for safeguarding maritime security in East Asia. In an endeavor to formulate policy, it is useful to compare the realities that East Asia is faced with to those of Europe. The following conceptual comparison may highlight what East Asia lacks in the current context.

	Europe	East Asia
<b>Disputes</b>	Land-centric	Maritime-centric
<b>Threat perception</b>	Concentric	Diversified
<b>Forms of Alliances</b>	Multilateral such as NATO	Bilateral such as US hub-and-spokes security arrangements
<b>Forms of Cooperative Security Organizations</b>	Permanent and Institution-based including daily meetings, secretariat, and effective capabilities	Consultation-based but without any permanent or sufficiently effective institutions
<b>Examples</b>	NATO/PfP, OSCE, etc.	ARF, ADMM+, etc.

Europe has nurtured a number of security institutions over the years going through the cold war and post-cold war periods. Europe enjoys a web of institutions such as EU, NATO, and OSCE while East Asia as a whole has developed a number of consultation mechanisms without consolidating any permanent institution except for ASEAN.

Although a number of annual meetings such as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asian Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and the East Asia Summit (EAS) have been playing the role of confidence building measures, there has been limited success due to lack of any permanent secretariat. That contrasts with Europe, where NATO (Partnership for Peace) and OSCE have been serving as cooperative security mechanisms for all participating countries and both boast of independent and strong institutions with permanent secretariats.

Thus it seems high time to give serious thought to launching a maritime security institution in East Asia that could function independently and impartially as a cooperative security mechanism, bringing in all maritime players in the region and beyond.

## **2. The OSCE as a Cooperative Security Model for the East Asia**

Among European security institutions, the OSCE stands as a good symbol of cooperative security institutions. The maritime security study group of IIPS has visited the OSCE secretariat in Vienna and also its field office in Kiev, Ukraine in September 2014 and interviewed a number of officials working in the OSCE during the course of research. This report is made on lessons learned from the OSCE experiences.

### **(1) History of the OSCE**

In 1954, at a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the four Great Powers (U.S., U.K., France, and the U.S.S.R.), the U.S.S.R. first proposed holding a conference on security in Europe. The U.S. and its Allies rejected the proposal, since it was offered as a replacement to NATO and did not provide for U.S. participation. However, in the improved political climate of the late 1960s, NATO countries began to consider expanding the détente process in Europe.

A key NATO prerequisite for holding a conference on security in Europe was fulfilled several years later, in 1971, with the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement between the U.S., U.K., France, and the U.S.S.R. After preliminary consultations in Winter 1972/73, the first Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was convened in Helsinki in 1973, with the participation of 35 States. The Conference concluded with the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The Helsinki Final Act is a politically, not legally, binding document that sets out principles of conduct in three areas: military-political, economic and environmental, and human rights.

From 1975 to 1990, the CSCE functioned as a series of conferences and meetings where new commitments were negotiated and their implementation periodically reviewed. In the post-cold war period, the CSCE developed into the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) based on the Paris Charter adopted in 1990 and strengthened its institutional capacities.


The Paris Charter established a permanent administrative infrastructure, which included a Secretariat, a Conflict Prevention Center, and an Office for Free Elections. A major arms control agreement—the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)—was also concluded on the margins of the Paris Summit. The Charter emphasizes the following points such as Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, Economic Liberty and Responsibility, Friendly Relations among Participating States, Security (arms control and confidence and building measures), and Unity (Europe whole and Free).

As part of this institutionalization process, the name was changed from the CSCE to the OSCE by a decision of the Budapest Summit of Heads of State or Government in December 1994.

## (2) Organization and principles of the OSCE

The OSCE is composed of 57 member states and 11 partners of cooperation including 5 Asian members. The organization of the OSCE is shown in the chart below.

### Organization of OSCE



Regarding the principles, the so-called “Decalogue” of the OSCE serves as fundamental common principles. The Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States in the first basket of the Helsinki Final Act includes the following principles:

1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force
3. Inviolability of frontiers
4. Territorial integrity of States
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes
6. Non-intervention in internal affairs
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief
8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
9. Co-operation among States
10. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law

### (3) Confidence Building Measures

The OSCE has been providing a number of various confidence building measures to the member states such as follows:

- Regular meetings at the Permanent Council in Vienna and the Forum of Security Co-operation
- Communication network among participants for the exchange of military information (Computer-based)
- Military CBMs such as exchange of military information, regulations on the specific military activities, and contacts/visiting/consultations among participants based on Vienna document of 2011
- Other Risk-reduction measures: Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation with Regard to Emergency Situations (Berlin Mechanism), Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations, etc.

In particular, we should note the importance of the Vienna Document. It is a very detailed document for military CBMs in OSCE since 1990. Its updated version was adopted in 2011. This document could serve as a good model for future CBM prototypes in East Asia. It is composed of 11 chapters that include Annual Exchange of Military Information, Defense Planning, Risk Reduction, Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities, and observation of Certain Military Activities, Compliance and Verification, and other measures.

The feature of the OSCE’s confidence building measures can be summarized as follows:

- Agreed basic principles
- Inclusiveness and Impartiality
- Established framework of CBMs
- Regular dialogue by the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation

- Daily activities of Secretariat and Monitoring Missions
  - Well-supported human resources and rudimentary use of “assets” such as UAVs to monitor the situation
  - Mutual complementarity of functions with other organizations and alliances
- The OSCE has never replaced the role of NATO even after the Cold War.

#### (4) Monitoring Activities in case of Ukraine

The ongoing conflict in the Eastern Ukraine in particular sheds light on the importance of monitoring activities by the OSCE. The OSCE field office is playing a critical role in conveying the facts on the ground as an impartial and independent player in the conflict.

It should be noted that all resolutions at the OSCE regarding its mission in Ukraine are taken on a consensus basis that included both Ukraine and Russia as its members. For instance, President Vladimir Putin of Russia also acknowledged the important role of the OSCE by saying at the meeting of the Valdai International Discussion on October 24, 2014:

*“This is true of improving the work of the UN, whose central role is irreplaceable, as well as the OSCE, which, over the course of 40 years, has proven to be a necessary mechanism for ensuring security and cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic region. I must say that even now, in trying to resolve the crisis in southeast Ukraine, the OSCE is playing a very positive role.”*

It is also worth mentioning that the OSCE field mission in Ukraine used even UAVs to monitor the Eastern states in Ukraine. The following points could be of much use in envisaging possible maritime monitoring activities in East Asia.

- “Special Monitoring Mission (SMM)” from March 21, 2014. Russia also agreed on this decision.
- SMM’s main tasks are to observe and report in an impartial and objective way on the situation in Ukraine, and to facilitate dialogue among all parties to the crisis.
- Gathering information through human contacts with actors including pro-Russian separatists.
- Utilizing several UAVs: SCHIEBEL’s camcopter S-100 are used for monitoring activities.
- Setting up two check-points on the Ukraine-Russia border for monitoring Russian activities not to send illegal materials to the east region Russia could use it to justify their own actions.
- Consisting of some 250 civilian unarmed monitors from more than 40 participating states and local staff from Ukraine as of September 2014.

Most recently, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Germany have agreed on concrete steps for the observers from the OSCE to monitor the situation in eastern Ukraine after the agreement on ceasefire on February 17, 2015.



### 3. Applicability of the OSCE model to the East Asia

It should be understood first that geopolitical environments between Europe and East Asia are distinctively different and European institutions have their own reasons why they have developed into the present forms. For this reason, any European model cannot be applied directly to East Asia. It is more realistic and pragmatic to build our idea based on realities and facts we have in the East Asia.

The following key points should be taken into consideration in this regard:

- **Basic principles** of the international society such as sovereign equality and refraining from the threat or use of force are also critical in East Asia while values-related principles such as respect for human rights or democratic values may be less applicable if the OSCE model is applied only to maritime issues.
- **Inclusiveness and openness** are needed for any cooperative security organization in East Asia. No state or region that has stakes in global commons such as East China Sea and South China Sea must be excluded. **Impartiality** is also critical for any activities by a cooperative security organization.
- **Regular contacts and dialogues in a multilateral environment** should be maintained in East Asia including in the time of maritime crisis.
- **Maritime CBMs** are urgently required in East Asia in contrast to a long history of the land-centric CBMs of the OSCE.
- **Maritime capacity building** is much needed in the case of ASEAN countries compared to activities of the OSCE.
- **Independent secretariat** is the key. Daily activities led by the secretariat in areas such as monitoring, sharing information, confidence-building, and capacity-building should play a central role.
- **Complementary relationship with the existing security cooperation and alliances** should be respected just as the OSCE has not replaced any role or mission of other organizations such as EU and NATO. Any other regional arrangements in East Asia should be mutually complementary.
- **Gradual process** in launching an idea on solid institution may be more appropriate in the East Asian context but it should be hastened given the urgency of the matter.

### 4. Basic Concept on the AMOSC

It would be a useful exercise to envision a new maritime security institution in East Asia that would be entrusted with various missions including maritime monitoring, maritime capacity-building, and confidence-building measures. Tentatively, we call this new institution “Asian Maritime Organization for Security and Cooperation” and its acronym reads “AMOSC.”

The AMOSC can be created, building upon “*acquis asiatique*” accumulated in a variety of fora such as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN, etc. Discussions on the AMOSC should be open to all stakeholders to Asian maritime security. Its principles, mission, and structure can be summarized as follows:

## (1) Principles

First, "Asian Maritime Charter for Peace and Prosperity" should serve as principles for solving maritime disputes. The charter should contain the following elements: peaceful settlement of maritime disputes and refraining from the threat or use of force, respect of International Law including the UNCLOS, safeguarding Maritime Commons, and other basic principles acceptable to all members.

The outcome of current discussions such as one about the code of conduct between China and ASEAN should be incorporated into possible principles of the AMOSC.

For this "Asian Maritime Charter for Peace and Prosperity" to be put into practice, a maritime security organization in East Asia may be established as the "Asian Maritime Organization for Security and Cooperation (AMOSC)."

## (2) Mission of the AMOSC

The mission of the AMOSC should contain at least three principal functions:

### ➤ **Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness**

The AMOSC dispatches its maritime monitors by patrol boats with crew on loan from its members (or of its own) to the area where a dispute may arise and reports to the Council on the relevant situation in an impartial manner. It also gathers information on any potential maritime dispute or danger in the region and provides early-warning to the members.

### ➤ **Maritime Capacity Building**

The AMOSC provides funding for technical assistance to nurture and develop coast guards in the members. It could also coordinate any necessary joint exercise involving coast guards and navies of the members. The AMOSC may function as a regional clearing house for needed training and capacities for members.

### ➤ **Maritime Confidence-Building Measures**

The AMOSC provides the members with fora where diplomats, coast guard officials, and navy officers of the members may exchange views regularly. It also intends to nurture respect and understanding on the rule of law including the UNCLOS. The members may also agree on exchange of information on military or non-military movement such as major maritime exercises in East Asia. If conditions are met, information on major maritime military exercises could be exchanged through the AMOSC.


## (2) Organization of the AMOSC

The organization of the AMOSC should be composed of a permanent council made up of representatives of the members, and a permanent secretariat together with necessary implementing tools such as monitoring boats with crews.

The following points may highlight some critical elements in creating an independent organization such as the AMOSC:

- The permanent council of the AMOSC will meet regularly.
- A permanent secretariat will be established in a capital of its members. It conducts necessary measures based on decisions of the council including timely dispatch of monitoring boats to a disputed area, various CBMs, and maritime capacity building.
- Staff of the secretariat initially can be seconded from the respective navies, coast guards, and foreign ministries of the members. Retired officials and officers of the members can be hired on a contract basis.
- Funding and necessary patrol boats will be contributed by the members. Staff will be contributed initially by the members. As the institution grows and matures, it can purchase its patrol boats and nurture its crew at a later stage.
- Membership in the AMOSC should be open to any stakeholder who wishes to contribute to enhancing Asian maritime security. Presence of members that can contribute financially or/and technically to the cause of the AMOSC is critical for capacity building. And the members who have stakes in global commons such as the East China Sea and South China Sea are also requested to join.
- The ASEAN centrality should be respected in the process leading to the establishment of the AMOSC. In this regard, the AMOSC can be established as an “expanded ASEAN Plus” organization under the umbrella of the East Asia Summit (EAS).
- Streamlining of ASEAN related meetings and organizations should be considered to minimize unnecessary duplication of functions with the AMOSC.
- The AMOSC functions independently but in close cooperation with existing international and regional organizations and architectures such as ARF, ASEAN, and other regional security arrangements.

### Idea on possible organization of the AMOSC



## 5. Conclusion

An institutional approach such as the AMOSC should be given serious consideration, as currently there is no break-through in sight for any maritime dispute in East Asia.

The AMOSC may not provide a final solution to the current maritime disputes in the region, as OSCE cannot solve the Ukrainian crisis either. However, AMOSC could provide a basis for a more credible, impartial, and lasting institutional mechanism to properly manage disputes and crises in East Asia.

Patient yet steady efforts for creating a new maritime security institution are key to lasting peace in the region. The following points for instance remain open for further elaboration and discussions:

- How to draw a roadmap for the realization of the AMOSC?
- What principle could be incorporated into the AMOSC
- Does the AMOSC assume a role for non-traditional security in the maritime domain too?
- What are the criteria for membership in the AMOSC? Whether or not non-state stakeholders such as shipping enterprises should be included as contributing members?
- Would the ASEAN member states perceive the idea of the AMOSC as a matter of serious discussion?
- How does ASEAN streamline the existing various fora and institutions in establishing the AMOSC?
- How could the AMOSC tap into the potential of the existing maritime institutions such as the Information Fusion Center and RECAAP in Singapore? Could it also establish useful links with the existing maritime training center such as the one established by Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency for regional cooperation?
- How would other countries other than ASEAN perceive the idea of the AMOSC?
- What kind of capacity building could U.S., Japan and Australia offer to those countries in need of maritime capacity building?
- What kind of new tools can be utilized to enhance maritime domain awareness? For instance, could UAVs and other means be used by the AMOSC?

IIPS intends to consult further with regional players including both official and non-official experts on this idea of the AMOSC to concretize the concept to be adopted as a realistic basis for region-wide official consideration in the near future.

[end]

## **(Appendix I)**

### **Summary of the Symposium on New Maritime Security Architecture in East Asia held by the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) in Tokyo on January 30, 2015**

In his opening remarks, Mr. Ken SATO, President of IIPS, proposed the idea of an “Asian Maritime Organization for Security and Cooperation (AMOSOC),” pointing out that there is no regional organization with maritime domain awareness which is most urgently required for tackling the current situation. He stressed that the idea of the AMOSOC would be a very timely proposal, given that the Japan-China summit meeting in November 2014 was followed by the recent Japan-China High-level Consultation on maritime affairs on January 22, and that this year would be the year of maritime cooperation between ASEAN and China.

In the first session, Dr. Shinichi KITAOKA, Executive Director of Research at IIPS and President of International University of Japan, served as moderator for the session entitled “Current Status and Views on Maritime Security Issues and Disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea.” The experts from the Philippines, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, and Japan respectively expressed their views.

Mr. Roilo Golez, former Senator from the Philippines, emphasized the negative impact of China’s current reclamation activities in the South China Sea islands on the regional and global balance of power.

Dr. Zhu Feng from Nanjin University, China stressed the importance of avoiding a security dilemma in the region by pointing out that both regional states as well as China are becoming more assertive on maritime issues.

Dr. John Chuan-tiong LIM from Academia Sinica, Taiwan emphasized there would be no final solution to maritime disputes in the South China Sea without Taiwan’s participation, so Taiwan must be recognized as a claimant state.

VADM Yoji KODA, former JMSDF Officer, Japan, referred to China’s reclamation of Woody Island, Johnson South Reef, and Scarborough Shoal which would create a strategic triangle in the center of the South China Sea, thus leading to fundamental changes regarding the regional strategic landscape.

As a conclusion, Dr. KITAOKA wrapped up the discussions by emphasizing the importance of solving maritime disputes through calm discussions and consultations based on international law in a multilateral environment.

After the coffee break, Mr. Futoshi MATSUMOTO, Senior Research Fellow at IIPS, provided a detailed explanation on the idea of “AMOSOC” based on the OSCE model.

He specified the central missions of the “AMOSOC” as threefold: (1) Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness, (2) Maritime Capacity Building, and (3) Maritime Confidence-Building Measures. The purpose of “AMOSOC” is to prevent and better manage current maritime disputes in an orderly manner, thus contributing to building and sustaining peace and order on a mid- and long-term basis.

In the second session, Mr. Ichiro FUJISAKI, Vice President of IIPS and former Ambassador to the U.S., served as moderator of discussions with the theme of the “Way Forward and Recommended Policies regarding Maritime Disputes in East Asia including a New Regional Maritime Architecture.” The experts from Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, and the U.S. expressed their comments and opinions.

Dr. Shafiah F. MUHIBAT from CSIS, Indonesia and Ms. Jane CHAN Git Yin from RSIS, Singapore shared some questions on the “AMOSC” proposal. They commented by saying that it might be better first to streamline the existing ASEAN architecture on maritime security rather than creating a new one, and need to better combine the AMOSC and the ASEAN centrality concept. In addition, they noted that Southeast Asians might hesitate to accept the idea if they are told to adopt any European centric model.

Dr. Balakrishnan R. K. SUPPAIAH, from Malaya University, Malaysia proposed the idea to start a more informal framework and develop it into a more formal one incrementally. To that end, he proposed the model of Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC).

Dr. John LEE, from Sydney University, Australia described the three conditions for the success of the proposal: (1) it must reflect the power distribution of the system, (2) it must recognize the geostrategic reality, and (3) the cost of non-compliance must be high. He emphasized the importance of an inclusive framework in this region.

Lastly, Dr. Patrick CRONIN from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), U.S. stressed the necessity for China to respect the rule of law in the maritime arena and commended the importance of adopting an inclusive framework such as the AMOSC in this region.

In closing, IIPS announced that it would compile the report on the desirable “New Maritime Security Architecture” based on our “AMOSC” proposal, further reflecting the comments and opinions expressed by the experts at the symposium by the end of March 2015.

With the upcoming report, IIPS is determined to continue to disseminate the idea on maritime security architecture including the AMOSC to officials and the public in regional countries and beyond with a view to promoting a framework to safeguard peace and order in the region.





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