In "hybrid warfare," which symbolizes the way modern wars are fought, information warfare is waged in peacetime to disrupt and undermine society through information manipulation. In light of the current situation in which cognitive warfare combined with disinformation and cyberattacks are deployed, we discuss the latest trends in cyberattack methods that continue to evolve, generation of disinformation by artificial intelligence (AI), new issues in social media platforms and digital infrastructure, and how platform operators are responding to information warfare. The latest trends were discussed with up-and-coming young researchers.

1. Date and time

December 18, 2024, 10:00 - 11:30

2. Panelists (titles omitted)

Tsuchiya Takahiro, Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Kyoto University of Advanced Science

Nagasako Tomoko, Researcher, Office of Cyber Domain Awareness, Information-technology Promotion Agency

Fuse Satoru, Executive Chief Fellow, Institute for International Socio-Economic Studies (IISE), Ltd.

Mochinaga Dai, Associate Professor, Cybersecurity Laboratory, College of Systems Engineering and Science, Shibaura Institute of Technology

Kawaguchi Takahisa, Senior Research Fellow, Tokio Marine dR Co., Ltd.

Moderator:
Osawa Jun, Senior Research Fellow, NPI; Leader, Research Project for Risks in the Information Sphere

On the day of the webinar, a lively discussion took place with a large number of participants from government ministries and agencies, corporations, researchers, and the mass media. The main points of the presentations and discussions by each panelist are as follows.

Tsuchiya Takahiro, "China's Cognitive Warfare"

・In recent years, U.S. investigations have revealed that China is developing large-scale botnet "spamouflage" operations. It is also utilizing generative AI and deepfake technology, which are likely to win an emotional response and credibility from recipients, to spread China's unique view of history and political perceptions to intellectuals and future elites in target countries.

・China's cognitive warfare is often inseparable from its cyber intelligence activities. In addition to disseminating confidential information about target countries and individuals obtained through hacking, it creates an environment in which it is difficult for recipients to discern the authenticity or falsity of information through a tactic called "hybrid exposure" that mixes fact and fiction.

・There is a limit to the amount of fact-checking that can be done on misinformation that is spread on a daily basis. Cognitive literacy education for the public is important, but it is difficult to expect immediate results. Countries subject to cognitive warfare need to go beyond defense and proactively establish strategic communication, such as sending out counter narratives.

Nagasako Tomoko, "Trends in Russia's Information and Cognitive Warfare"

・In recent years, Russia has been spreading narratives favorable to its own country through tactics such as political bots that send out AI-generated multilingual social networking posts, fake web media, and the misuse of fact-checking organizations to carry out influence operations targeting election campaigns in other countries.

・Russia's cognitive warfare strategy can be divided into three broad categories: (1) "information conflict," that targets everything from the opposing country's information infrastructure to the psychological and cognitive domains of individuals; (2) "information weapons," which are technologies and methods used in information warfare; and (3) "reflexive control," in which key factors in the opponent's world view and decision-making process are altered to guide decision-making in favor of one's own country. Among these, emphasis is placed on the persuasive influence on people's beliefs and values.

・Russia is conducting hybrid information and cognitive warfare that combines disinformation, fake news, and cyberattacks. In recent years, there has been an increase in cases of cyberattacks in which multiple types of attack are combined: those that target "functional disruption," "information theft," and "information manipulation." This development highlights the necessity for integrated preparedness in both cybersecurity and information / cognitive warfare.

Fuse Satoru, "Microtargeting and the Weaponization of Data"

・With the development of digital technology, the target of cognitive warfare has expanded to individuals. This is because the online advertising technique called "micro-targeting," which uses detailed data on personal attributes and interests, has been applied to cognitive warfare and espionage activities.

・In the U.S., in 2015, a hacking incident exposed big data of 21 million federal employees. At the time, even though a large amount of data was leaked, profiling technology was not sufficiently advanced to enable influence operations such as exploiting vulnerabilities through threats or recruiting collaborators (spies) to exploit individual vulnerabilities. However, with the emergence of AI, big data analysis has progressed and the weaponization of data has become a reality.

・The risk of negative influence on important decision-making and public opinion formation in one's country has increased dramatically due to "micro-targeting." How to protect personal data is extremely important, but this alone is not enough. It is also important to utilize big data that does not consist of personal information as a strategic asset.

Mochinaga Dai, "Authoritarianism and Digital Platforms"

・Information and communication technology (ICT) in China is highly prioritized from three perspectives: strengthening national security, economic development, and political stability. It should be noted that ICT is being used to modernize China's social governance.

・ICT has both positive and negative compatibility with authoritarian regimes. For such regimes, the positive aspect is that the control of information can limit the freedom of the people, make the competitive environment favorable to the rulers, and allow the rulers to manipulate public opinion to match their objectives. The negative aspect is that large-scale control of information is difficult. In a dictatorial regime, for example, it takes a very long time for the narrative intended by the central government to reach the grassroots, and, if it is altered at lower levels, the distorted version will spread. A lapse in control by a single person reigning at the center can affect the entire system, creating a single point of failure. It is not necessarily the case that ICT and authoritarian regimes are well-aligned.

Kawaguchi Takahisa, "Where We Are Now in Digital Platform Regulation"

・In democratic countries, although they have had significant social influence, digital platforms (DPs) have been criticized for insufficient governance, transparency, and predictability. As a result, governments in various countries are establishing and enforcing DP regulations related to various agendas such as competition-related, content moderation, media protection, personal data transfer regulations, etc.

・The approach to DP regulation differs greatly between the U.S., Europe, China, and other regions. Europe has two of the strongest comprehensive DP regulations, the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA). In the U.S., antitrust laws were enforced during the Biden administration. However, European-style DP regulation is not necessarily a universal model for democratic societies. For example, Republic of Korea and Taiwan have each tried to emulate the European-style DP regulation but ultimately abandoned these efforts.

・In Japan, it is thought that a European approach will be taken, advocating "voluntary efforts" by DPs with respect to the development of a fair competitive environment and countermeasures against disinformation.

After the panelists' presentations, Moderator and Project Leader Osawa Jun posed the following questions, which were discussed among the panelists.

1. What are your thoughts about the current state of cooperation between China and Russia in information warfare and cognitive warfare?

It has been confirmed that military personnel from both countries exchange information on methods of information and cognitive warfare. In recent years, Russia has been conducting foreign influence operations using influencers, imitating Chinese methods. In Europe, Chinese and Russian intelligence agencies are cooperating to conduct espionage activities and intelligence operations, which is a serious situation for the target countries. In the future, in addition to the two countries, Iran may also collaborate, and caution should be exercised.

2. What do you think about the role of AI in information warfare and cognitive warfare?

With the advent of generative AI, language barriers, including those related to the Japanese language, have been overcome, facilitating influence operations against various countries. The speed at which disinformation is generated and spread has drastically increased. Although malicious content can be detected and deleted in the social media space, information generated by generative AI can avoid such detection. It is still in its infancy, but research to utilize AI to automate fact-checking of disinformation is underway.

3. How can we, as individuals, respond to information warfare?

It is important to develop the sense that the information we come into contact with on a daily basis may have been altered and presented with someone's own interpretation. We should approach information with the assumption that all information is influenced by subjectivity and personal bias. Since events in the world are complex, we should be cautious of information that is too simple or easy to understand. It should also be noted that everyone is at risk of unknowingly contributing to the spread of disinformation. We need to have the courage to stop and think before carelessly spreading information we come across.