1. Background to and Lessons from the Russian Invasion

Based on the analysis that Russia's initial aim at the time of the invasion was to use hybrid warfare (warfare in a gray zone where a variety of military and non-military methods are deliberately combined so as not to lead to a full-scale military invasion), the following four lessons were drawn.

　① Importance of disabling various means of hybrid warfare

　② Importance of deterring use of the "threat of force"

　③ How to prepare for a full-scale military invasion that cannot be ignored in the 21st century

　④ The "Stability-Instability Paradox" due to the continuing nuclear existence

　

2. Implications for the Military Environment in East Asia

As China seeks more sophisticated hybrid warfare, North Korea remains adventurous, and Russia seeks to exert its influence as a nuclear power.

　

3. Recommendations for Strengthening Japan's Security

(1) Policy to strengthen countermeasures against hybrid warfare in the gray zone

The following measures are recommended to strengthen the nation's overall response to hybrid warfare.

　

Recommendation 1:

Establish a comprehensive command post to strengthen measures against hybrid warfare

In order to detect and respond to hybrid threats, a command organization capable of issuing instructions to related ministries and agencies based on the latest relevant information and a command center capable of constantly monitoring the situation should be established.

　　

Recommendation 2:

Establish a Hybrid Threat Analysis Center

To address hybrid threats, establish a Hybrid Threat Analysis Center to conduct research by public and private sector researchers, provide a training exercise environment for government agencies, and exchange and consolidate information among governments, and collaborate with neighboring countries and other organizations.

　

Recommendation 3:

Improve the readiness of information dissemination to win the battle in the "cognitive domain"

In order to respond to the manipulation of public opinion and various types of influence operations using dissemination of disinformation, a countermeasures department will be established within the National Security Secretariat and an organization to take systematic countermeasures will be put in place. Particular attention should be given to strengthening the dissemination of information to the international community, responding to foreign propaganda based on their peculiar historical perspectives and legal interpretations, and developing social network services and other analytical tools.

　

Recommendation 4:

Address advanced technological fields such as cyber, electromagnetic waves, drones, and space

To address cyber defense, clarify as a nation the position of active cyber defense, establish a cyber defense system, and clarify the division of roles and points of contact between Japan and the United States. In addition, to strengthen the SDF's cyber defense capability, education and research should be conducted in cooperation with the private sector.

　　

Recommendation 5:

Establish a system to properly deal with disguised armed groups

Establish a system of coordination between law enforcement and the SDF, as well as between Japan and the U.S., in order to respond to the method of using armed groups disguised as the state to create an appearance of state involvement.

　

Recommendation 6:

Promote regional coordination and cooperation in East Asia, centered on Japan and the U.S.

Strengthen various non-military ties between Japan and Taiwan, and enhance resilience against hybrid warfare in the context of regional coordination and cooperation in East Asia, with the U.S. at the core.

　

(2) Measures to restrain and deter threat of force in East Asia

In order to prevent "threat of force" from developing into armed invasion, the following measures are recommended.

　

Recommendation 7:

Strengthen international norms to restrain threat of force

In order to increase the effectiveness of international norms that do not permit acts that constitute threat of force, the government will develop public and private sector monitoring capabilities and build a diplomatic framework to apply effective pressure.

　

Recommendation 8:

Develop an appropriate deterrence system that does not allow threats to escalate

Simulations should be conducted in advance regarding flexible implementation of Japan-U.S. joint exercises that address the deterrence of escalation as well as discussion of common criteria for assessing the situation that will serve as a basis for Japan-U.S. joint response as the situation evolves.

　

(3) Measures that should be strengthened to protect the Japanese people in the event of a full-scale military invasion

To ensure the protection of the people in the event of a full-scale military invasion, the following measures are recommended.

　

Recommendation 9:

Develop a comprehensive defense capability that can respond to multi-domain operations

In order to integrate the hybrid warfare measures described in Recommendations 1) through 5) with the actions of the SDF in dealing with military invasion, development of comprehensive defense capabilities, including research and development in the relevant fields, should be implemented.

　

Recommendation 10:

Establish a basic policy for responding to a Taiwan Strait crisis or a Korean Peninsula crisis

In particular, joint Japan-U.S. efforts to deal with a Taiwan crisis and to defend Japan should be examined, while taking into consideration interoperability with friendly countries to secure missiles, ammunition and ammunition depots, and means of transportation.

　

Recommendation 11:

Strengthen the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence

Japan and the U.S. should urgently deepen discussions on what specific measures would be effective to increase the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and to address the Stability-Instability Paradox.

　

Recommendation 12:

Strengthen the command and coordination function between Japan and the U.S. (not only for diplomacy and defense, but also as a government-wide coordination mechanism)

In order to deal with multi-domain threats, establish a mechanism that transcends diplomatic and military frameworks to enable a government-as-a-whole approach to consult and coordinate Japan-U.S. security and strengthen the command and control function to implement it.

　

Recommendation 13:

Take into consideration the protection of the Japanese public and a wide range of civilians including those of relevant countries

Understand in a systematic way the real situation of civilian protection in wars occurring around the world, and formulate and implement more effective measures to protect the public.